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Introduction 
Different actors and even geographical areas with which Argentina has 
prioritized its ties can be traced overtime. However, the Middle East has never 
had a special place in the agenda of external relations of the country. On the 
contrary, it has been a marginal area with regard to its relations both in 
political and economic terms. This can be explained by the geographical gap 
between those territories; also, by the lack of shared idiosyncrasies, such as 
religion, and social and cultural terms, since the South American country is 
markedly different from the states comprising the space that has been called the 
Middle East – an area in which, moreover, coexist different ethnic and religious 
groups, as well as different political regimes, and which has become 
internationally notorious internationally for its high number of conflicts. 
 In fact, this area has been the stage of some of the major conflicts that 
have taken place in recent times. Among them, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
has kept the region on the edge for decades because of its serious regional 
                                                 
1 Researcher of CONICET. Faculty of Political Science and International Relations, Universidad 
Nacional de Rosario (UNR). E-mail: ornela_fabani@hotmail.com. 
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implications and the large number of actors, statal or not, directly or indirectly 
involved in the dispute. 
 Overtime, Argentina has adopted an equidistant position about the 
Palestinian-Israeli question. Also, many administrations have chosen to 
support conciliatory resolutions adopted within international organizations. 
 Indeed, Argentina has defended the peaceful settlement of the conflict, 
urging the parties to comply with the resolutions emanating from the United 
Nations Security Council. In this regard, it has supported the search for a stable 
and lasting peace based on the recognition of the right of Palestinians to form 
an independent state with its own territory, and also exercise their inalienable 
right to self-determination. As well as the right of Israel to live in peace within 
secure and internationally recognized borders, in accordance with the provisions 
of Resolutions No. 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) of the UN Security Council. 
 Considering the aforementioned factors, the aim of this study is to 
analyze Argentina's foreign policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during 
the Raúl Alfonsín administration (1983-1989). The article is based on the 
assumption that the search for a solution to this conflict was not amongst the 
themes of primary interest to the Argentinean government under this Partido 
Radical’s administration. On the other hand, we sustain that the Alfonsín 
administration embraced the traditional equidistance policy historically 
adopted by Argentina towards the Israeli-Palestinian dispute as a hypothesis. 
Finally, the chosen period, extending from December 1983 to July 1989, is 
justified by the shortage of studies that address this theme during these years. 
 In addition, it is important to specify a set of concepts that are central 
to the analysis: foreign policy, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, equidistance, change 
and continuity in foreign policy. 
 Thus, when referring to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we approach 
the dispute between the people of Israel and the Palestinian people, also as part 
of an even larger dispute, the Arab-Israeli conflict, involving the State of Israel 
and its Arab counterparts. 
 In order to situate ourselves in time and space, it is important to stress 
that the conflict has a long history, although it is still relevant in the agenda of 
international politics nowadays. In fact, although there is no consensus about 
its origins, many analysts agree to point out that the beginning of the conflict 
happened in 1947, when the United Nations opted for the partition of the 
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Palestinian territory, as stipulated in Resolution 181/11 of the General 
Assembly. 
 On that occasion, Argentina was one of the countries that abstained 
from voting. In this regard, there have been various studies that attempt to 
explain the motives that guided the country to choose that position (Rein 2007; 
Botta 2011). Initial motivations aside, the truth is that such position was the 
starting point of what would become the Argentinian equidistance pattern that 
has prevailed in respect to this conflict. 
 As already stated, the country has tended to embrace for years this 
equidistance policy, based on the concern of various administrations to balance 
any gesture or action that could be interpreted as a gap in the equal treatment 
of the leading protagonists of the dispute (Mendez 2009, 89) and has been in line 
with the will to preserve good relations with both sides presented by successive 
national administrations. 
 Under this logic, the search for compensation of favorable gestures to 
one or another actor is explained by the Argentine will to avoid assuming 
internal and external costs that would come along with aligning with one of the 
parties, especially considering the limited relevance of this dilemma within the 
agenda of Argentina’s foreign policy. 
 On the other hand, since this is an article about Argentina’s foreign 
policy, it should be mentioned that it is conceived as a public policy (Ingram 
and Fiederlein 1988), which is expressed in a set of decisions and actions taken 
by authorities of a state, in response to certain demands and conditions, both 
internal and external. These decisions are calculated to change or to preserve 
the conditions of the international context, always aiming to promote the 
interests and values of the state in the international system (Perina 1988, 13). 
 The Alfonsín administration’s foreign policy did not evinced a change 
that could be translated into a break of that equidistance pattern––
understanding “change” as the abandonment of one or more of the foreign 
policy orientations and the variations in the content or ways of putting that 
policy into practice. On the contrary, the administration has primed for the 
continuity of traditional position concerning the conflict––the idea of 
“continuity” being the maintenance without interruption of certain guidelines 
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in one or more areas of foreign policy issues and in the basic dynamics of 
decision-making (Russell 1991, 10-11). 
 
 
The main axes of the Alfonsín administration foreign policy 
Raúl Alfonsín came into the presidency of Argentina on December 10, 1983 
after the completion of the first democratic elections in the country after ten 
years. 
 Domestically, right after years of a cruel military rule, the president 
had to face strong demands of the population, then centered on the respect for 
civil liberties, human rights and the punishment for crimes committed under 
the previous order. He also had to take charge of a complex economic situation 
characterized by fiscal deficit, external debt, capital flight and high inflation. 
 With reference to the external ambit, Alfonsín found an internationally 
isolated country. Violations of human rights, the rejection of the arbitral award 
on the Beagle issue and the subsequent escalation of the conflict with Chile, 
which led Argentina to the brink of war with the Transandinean country, as 
well as the Falklands War, all resulted in the loss of credibility and foreign 
confidence in the state. 
 Regarding the international scenario in which the new administration 
took power, the first half of the eighties was characterized by renewed tensions 
between the two superpowers in the context of the Cold War. In fact, the 
Reagan administration outlined his foreign policy based on the perception of a 
Soviet advance in the Third World during that period. 
 Meanwhile, the conflicts in Central America and the debt crisis that 
affected the whole of Latin America cannot be overlooked in the regional level. 
The first installed the fear that the domestic condition of Nicaragua and El 
Salvador could escalate and endanger the democratic transitions in other Latin 
American countries. The second, linked to the strong financial flows that 
entered the region during the previous decade and the subsequent increase in 
international interest rates, was particularly hard to Argentina, which stopped 
receiving external funding after the Mexican default declaration along with 
other states of the region. 
 After this brief description of the context in which the new government 
came to power, this article will start to work on the main lines of its foreign 
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policy taking as a source for analysis the inaugural address to the Legislative 
Assembly of December 10, 1983 . 
 In terms of principles, the new president stated during the speech that 
“[we will] sustain in foreign policy the principles of national sovereignty, self-
determination of peoples, non-intervention, equality of sovereign states and 
Latin American solidarity” and that “[we will] support the aspirations of 
developing countries, the universal observance of human rights and non-
alignment”. Then, Alfonsín added: “we will accommodate national tradition in 
favor of peaceful settlement of disputes” (Alfonsín 1983, our translation). 
 On the other hand, from a broader approach the head of state 
highlighted that “our policy [would] be one of independence, in harmony and 
friendship with all members of the international community, and based on the 
recognition of ideological plurality and on the decisive rejection of every form of 
imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism.” He also emphasized that “from a 
position of strict non-alignment, an action in support of the distension between 
blocks must be made effective” (Alfonsín 1983. Our translation). 
 Regarding the relations with the United States, they were described as 
“difficult” and it was asked that this nation could change its behavior in 
Central America, arguing in favor of the principle of nonintervention. 
 On other subjects, the new administration announced it would give 
priority to emphasize links with developing countries and it affirmed its goal of 
maintaining an active participation in international forums that were an 
expression of it, such as the case of the Non-Aligned Movement and the G77. 
 Accordingly, the need to prioritize relations with the Latin American 
republics was stressed. Afterwards, it was highlighted that it was imperative to 
intensify cooperation with Asian and African countries. 
 Other topics that were also emphasized were: the importance of curbing 
the arms race, the Central American crisis, the claim over the Falkland Islands 
and the defense of a reorganization of international economic relations. 
 Finally, regarding the issue promptly relevant here, President Alfonsín 
also referred in his speech to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. With reference to 
this topic, the head of state embraced the traditional Argentinian position on 
the case to plead in favor of “respect for the existence of Israel, whose people 
have the inalienable right to live in peace without the constant concern of 
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hostile acts” and also the “respect for the aspiration of the Palestinian people to 
freely architecting their destiny in their own land” (Alfonsín 1983. Our 
translation). This statement is listed by Méndez (2008, 112) as the most open 
manifestation of the traditional principle of equidistance supported by the 
Argentinian government about the case. 
 As understood after the aforementioned declarations, the Radical 
administration formulated a conceptual framework in order to start this new 
phase of external relations. This framework then established that “Argentina 
[was] a Western, non-aligned and developing country”. In the words of Foreign 
Minister Dante Caputo (1986. Our translation): “those are the three basic 
elements of our national reality from which we build our relationship with the 
world”. To which the aspiration to be a moral power was added: “[...] not just a 
country in which human rights are respected, but from now also a country that 
raises its voice against any violation of these rights in any part of world” 
(Alfonsín 1984. Our translation). 
 In this context, the Alfonsín administration outlined as the main 
objective of its foreign policy to achieve the international reinsertion of 
Argentina. According to Russell (1994, 7), the basic pillars of the foreign policy 
that pursued these objectives were: the development of a mature relationship 
with the United States; the active participation towards problems that were 
part of the North-South issue; the strengthening of relations with Latin 
America; and the narrowing of political and economic relations with Western 
Europe. 
 Thus, the reinsertion was thought as based on a multilateral framework 
and was not restricted to a special relationship with the hegemonic power, as it 
was the case during the Menem administration. On the contrary, it intended to 
expand the number and range of partners partners that Argentina had in the 
international level, in order to broaden its margins of autonomy (Simonoff 1999, 
80). 
 Regarding the link with the Middle East, as mentioned, it was one of 
the areas in which Argentina maintained a low profile relation, which in some 
ways is evinced by finding that Alfonsín visited only two states in the region 
during his whole administration: Algeria (1984) and Saudi Arabia (1986). It is 
worth mentioning that a trip to Israel, which would transform the Radical 
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leader into the first Argentinian representative to visit the Jewish state, was 
also planned, but it was postponed. 
 It is important to add that during this period the region went through a 
particularly complex situation due to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the 
Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the confrontation between Iran and Iraq and, 
of course, the ongoiing conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, which was far 
from reaching a solution. However, in spite of this scenario, there was no foreign 
policy framework for this region. Quite the opposite, routine and punctual 
actions based on specific interests prevailed (Lechini 2006). 
 On the other hand, the democratic regime parted itself from its 
predecessor and highlighted the similarities and not the differences between 
Argentina and Southern nations, based on their condition of underdeveloped 
countries (Lechini 2006, 40). Thus, the region was considered as a part of the 
South-South Cooperation strategy which implementation was meant to help 
Argentina to come closer to other Third World countries seeking joint solutions 
to common problems concerning the North. So, the implemented agenda for the 
region particularly sought to gain support for Argentina's claim to the Falkland 
Islands and also to a political approach to the problem of external debt, among 
other issues (Carrancio 1994, 279). In fact, the Arab vote was important not 
only to the Malvinas issue but also for the eletion of Chancellor Caputo for the 
presidency of the UN General Assembly during its 43rd session in 1988. 
Moreover, although this issue will not be studied in this work, the sales of 
military equipment to Iran continued, as well as the deepening of scientific-
technological cooperation regarding knowledge exchange and joint work in the 
nuclear ambit with other countries of the region. 
 With reference to the specific conflict here analyzed, as evinced below,  
Argentina continued to embrace the policy that became the traditional pattern 
of the country concerning this dispute: equidistance. 
 After this first approach to the subject, the following sections aim to 
analyze the link between the Argentinian government, Jewish communities and 
local Arabic and their respective countries/reference entities. The country's 
position on the conflict in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and in the United 
Nations (UN), the main multilateral arenas chosen to treat this subject, are also 
going to be approached. 
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The relation between the Radical government, the Jewish local community and 
the State of Israel 
The link between the new Argentinian government, the State of Israel and the 
Jewish community began to be constructed right after the Radical 
administration took office. The presidential inauguration ceremony was 
attended by a delegation sent by State of Israel, in which David Kimche, 
Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, took part. However, as 
discussed below, while the relationship with the local community seemed to 
consolidate daily, once the final balance of the administration is made, the 
relations with Tel Aviv were not equally positive. Although the relations 
between the two states did not necessarily deteriorated, that link was not up to 
the relationship the Argentinian government had with the local Jewish 
community. 
During the first phase of the Alfonsín government, accordingly to the 
difficult domestic situation and the aforementioned demands concerning the 
punishment for crimes committed under the previous regime, the Argentina-
Israel relations were strongly characterized by the eagerness of both parties to 
establish the fate of Jews that had disappeared during the military dictatorship. 
Therefore, a fact that both Tel Aviv and the local Jewish community regarded 
as very positive was the appointment of two Jews2 to join the National 
Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP, initials in Spanish), 
whose formation was driven during the first months of the Radical 
administration. 
A correlated fact, Israel sent a parliamentary delegation to Argentina in 
March 1984 in order to request information to CONADEP. The members of the 
delegation were received by the Minister of the Interior, Antonio Troccoli, in 
the context of a meeting at which the Israeli Ambassador in Argentina, Dov 
Schmorak, asked Buenos Aires to use his position in the Third World to avoid 
constant condemnations of Israel in international forums (JTA 1984a). Thus, 
this order becomes a clear example of the pressures that the Radical 
                                                 
2 Gregorio Klimovsky, part of the Latin American section of the World Jewish Congress, and Rabbi 
Marshall Meyer, leader of the spiritual congregation Beth El. 
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administration suffered along its entire management from both the government 
of Israel and the local and international Jewish communities, aiming the 
adoption of favorable attitudes to their interests by Argentina. However, 
Buenos Aires did not reply to that request, since becoming a partner of one of 
the parties involved would surely have higher costs than benefits for a country 
with no vital interests at stake in the conflict. This was especially important in 
a time when, as aforementioned, Argentina struggled to achieve its 
international reinsertion and aspired to expand the number and range of its 
external linkages, including the Arab countries. 
Later, President Alfonsín and Chancellor Caputo received in Buenos 
Aires Nathan Perlmutter, National Director of the Anti-Defamation League 
and of B'nai B'rith, as well as other members of the League’s Department of 
Latin American Affairs. Another example of the broad political contacts that 
were held with senior officials of the Jewish community worldwide was the 
arrival of the President of the World Jewish Congress, Edgar Bronfman, in 
September 1984. The latter met the first Argentine president at a meeting when 
Alfonsín expressed its rejection of the association between Zionism and racism, 
and even proposed to contribute for an approach that would serve to address 
the issue of Soviet Jews (JTA 1984b). Afterwards, in another sign of goodwill 
towards the community and the State of Israel, Alfonsín sent a draft law to the 
National Assembly punishing discrimination based on race or religion, in which 
special reference to discrimination against Jewish citizens was made, 
accompanied by a message that emphasized the commitment of the democratic 
government to respect for and promotion of human rights. 
Besides, a very present subject during Alfonsín administration that 
generated a strong concern in Tel Aviv and among members of the local Jewish 
community was the possibility that the Argentine government would grant 
permission for the establishment of a delegation from the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) in the country. At that time, the Jewish community press 
highlighted the heavy advertising that began after November 29, day of 
solidarity to the Palestinian people, and statements by senior officials of the 
Arab community that held it was very likely that the government could make 
something about it (JTA 1985a). Indeed, even the traditional daily Argentine 
Financial Field mentioned the pressures from the Arab and Jewish 
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communities, for and against that permission, which the national government 
was under (JTA 1985c). In this context, DAIA requested a meeting with 
national authorities in order to express their resentment to the granting of such 
authorization, particularly bearing in mind the Argentine solidarity with the 
Third World, especially in a time when the country’s nomination for the 
presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement was under consideration. However, 
President Alfonsín pledged “no support to any initiative that could be 
detrimental to national unity” during the meeting (JTA 1985d). 
The stance adopted by the government when addressing this issue is 
easily understood if one considers, first, the limited support, both international 
and regional, held by the PLO at that time and, second, the good relations 
between the local Jewish community and the national government. In fact, the 
fact that this community had affirmed strong support for the Alfonsín 
campaign during the previous elections, to such extent that the Latin American 
branch of the World Jewish Congress quoted itself of the fiercest defenders of 
such administration, cannot be overlooked (JTA 1985d). 
In line with the thriving relations held with the local Jewish 
community, in mid-1985 Alfonsín participated of a Jewish teleological seminar, 
where he even received an award for his contribution to human rights and 
religious pluralism. Moreover, in another gesture well received by such 
community, and also largely a response to the efforts made, the list of 
candidates in the province of Buenos Aires for the legislative elections that year 
was headed by a Jew, Marcelo Stubrin. Indeed, a hallmark of this government 
applauded by the community, which for years had been kept out of the political 
sphere, was the widespread presence of Jews in high public offices3. A slogan 
then implemented by sectors of the opposition when referring to this 
characteristic was the “radical synagogue”. Either way, this should not lead to 
infer a privileged Jewish presence in the political arena if one bears in mind that 
at that time there was also a large number of members of the Arab community 
who held occupied high positions. At one time during the Alfonsín 
                                                 
3 Among the Jews who occupied high positions in office, we can name: Marcos Aguinis, Culture 
Secretary; Cesar Jaroslasky, Chairman of the Radical bloc n the Chamber of Deputies; Bernardo 
Grinspun, first Minister of Economy in the Alfonsín cabinet; Leopoldo Portnoi, president of Central 
Bank; and James Fiterma, Secretary for Public Works of the City of Buenos Aires, just to name a few. 
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administration, nearly a third of the governors of the Argentine provinces were 
descendants of Arabs. 
Despite the excellent relationship built with the Jewish community, it 
must be stressed that the link with Israel did not present the same intensity 
after a series of decisions adopted by Argentina, in line with its traditional 
stance of equidistance. These decisions were not well received by Tel Aviv. For 
example, Buenos Aires criticized the actions of Israel in Lebanon and the 
Radical administration rejected the Israeli response to the Intifada until the last 
moments of the Alfonsín government. In fact, some argue that the frustrated 
Alfonsín’s visit to Israel, which also led to friction between the parties, was 
suspended because the Argentine government judged that it would be 
inappropriate to arrive at that country during the period of the Intifada and 
the subsequent repression by the Israeli army to Palestinians. Obviously, the 
first democratic government in Argentina after years of the bloodiest of military 
regimes, an administration that raised the banner of human rights and that 
intended to become “a moral power” was not willing to visit a country whose 
action was being heavily criticized by the international community at that 
particular moment. Another point of friction between the two governments 
took place after Argentina not only condemned Israeli actions in the Palestinian 
territory at the United Nations, but also defended the right to self-
determination of the people from Palestine (JTA 1985d). Moreover, the 
rejection of Argentina to the move of the capital of Israel from Tel Aviv to 
Jerusalem did not favor deepening the bond between the two countries. 
Regarding this issue, Argentina maintained its stance even after calls and 
efforts of Israel and the attitude of other Latin American countries that 
established diplomatic missions in the holy city. However, Argentina remained 
firm in its position, according to which a high impact action, like transferring its 
embassy in Israel, would be counterproductive and contrary to the policy of 
equidistance. For a decision of such features would have undoubtedly affected 
the relations with some Third World countries, and particularly with other 
states in the Middle East with which Argentina was also interested in preserving 
their ties, as old as those held with the State of Israel. Furthermore, Argentina 
traded with Iran not only grains, but also weapons, scientific and technological 
cooperation was advancing at the nuclear level with this and other countries in 
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the region, and the Latin American also support needed these countries’s 
support in international forums. This support was especially needed when 
dealing with subjects that, unlike the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, had a leading 
role in Argentina's foreign policy agenda, as was the case of Malvinas and the 
political negotiation of debt, at a time when the country was facing a serious 
crisis economic. 
On the other hand, despite of the aforementioned disagreements, the 
national government strongly condemned the attack on a synagogue in Istanbul 
in mid-1986 and the Argentine president met with former Israeli president 
Ephrain Katziren during the Latin American Conference of Friends of the 
University of  Tel Aviv. It is also worth to mention the signing of an agreement 
between the National Council of Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET, 
initials in Spanish), the National Institute of Industrial Technology (INTI, 
initials in Spanish), and the Faculty of Physics and Science of the Universidad 
de Buenos Aires with the Weizmann Institute, as well as the visit of the deans 
of the Universidad Nacional de Rosario and Universidad del Salvador to Israel 
in 1987. Moreover, it is particularly important to note that before the uprisings 
of Easter, the Foreign Affairs Minister of Israel sent a message of support and 
encouragement to the Argentine government (Singer 1989, 273). These actions 
show that although Israel did not perceive the relations with Argentina greatly, 
they remained friendly. 
To conclude this section, a brief consideration for the competing 
positions that arose within the Jewish community after the approval of the 
Obediencia Debida and Punto Final acts must be added. Although some sectors 
defended the need for the introduction of such legal instruments in order to 
advance a process of democratic consolidation and national reconciliation, 
others harshly criticized the policy adopted by the Radical government, 
including David Goldberg, then president of DAIA (Singer 1989, 273). It can 
definitely be argued that the local Jewish community institutions manifested a 
strong support for the democratic regime that went hand in hand with some 
criticism to the adoption of the aforementioned laws. 
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Claims made by the incipient pro-Palestine organizations 
With regard to the Arab community in Argentina, the third most relevant in 
the country, institutional development has a long history, having begun in the 
late nineteenth century. However, the most important institution acting on its 
behalf, FEARAB Argentina, a tertiary institution that gathers various 
provincial federations, was created in 1972 has generally maintained a friendly 
relationship with the diverse national administrations ever since. 
 A feature of the Alfonsín administration that has to be highlighted is 
that it coincides with the very institutional development of the Palestinian 
community in Argentina. A few months before Radicalismo came into power the 
foundations of what would later become the Argentine-Palestinian Federation 
were being laid. This institution, the first to finally represent this small 
community in the country, was mobilized by a group of Chilean exiles of 
Palestinian origin who left the neighboring country and settled in Argentina 
after the coup of General Pinochet. 
 In 1984, this group formed a theater company that generated a space of 
interchange for Argentine people of Palestinian origin. This was the starting 
point to try to reunite the Palestinian community in Argentina and also to 
create instruments to publicize the situation of the Palestinian people in the 
country (Montenegro and Setton 2009, 6). The Argentine-Palestinian Sanaud 
Cultural Center (Centro Cultural Argentino Palestino Sanaud, in Spanish) was 
also created that year, with the mission to raise awareness of the history, 
culture and political of those territories. 
 In the year of 1987, the Argentine-Palestinian Federation was created. 
Its structure implied that the Palestinian community had the support of an 
institution that still today defends their interests and gives publicity to their 
claims, previously transmitted through representatives of other organizations of 
the Arab community as a whole, like FEARAB. 
 With respect to the entity that emerged as the sole representative of the 
Palestinian people internationally, the Palestinian National Authority, it 
should be mentioned that still did not exist in the 1980s. Hence, Argentina did 
not recognize the PLO in this period. 
 In this context, in the early-1980s the Argentine Committee of 
Solidarity with Palestinian People was created, from which the Palestinian 
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Information Office in Argentina was originated in 1985. In the words of a 
person who was both its director and Secretary-General, Suhail Akel, the group 
searched for “the vindication of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian People, 
the publicization of the Palestinian question, the rememberance of key dates for 
our people” and particularly “the defense of the recognition by the Argentine 
government of a future diplomatic office of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization” (Diario Rio Negro 1989). 
 In any case, months before the establishment of such diplomatic 
mission and very particularly after the commemoration of the Day of Solidarity 
with the Palestinian people, the Jewish community explained its dissatisfaction 
with a strong campaign for the Argentine recognition of PLO, as 
aforementioned. Without going any further, the event organized by the 
Argentine-Arab Foundation, which took place on November 29, 1984, was 
attended by national government authorities, parliamentarians of the Partido 
Justicialista and the Director of International Organizations of the Foreign 
Ministry, Ambassador Julio Barbosa. In this context, the possibility that 
Parliament would require Alfonsín to recognize the PLO was suggested (JTA 
1985a). Furthermore, the president of the Argentine-Arab Foundation said 
shortly after that the Argentine government was giving positive samples in 
their attitude toward the Palestinian cause (JTA 1985b). 
 It is worth to mention that the efforts for the recognition of the PLO in 
the country were also supported by the then representative of the organization 
in Brazil, Farid Suwwan, which at that time repeatedly traveled to Argentina 
to support this cause (JTA 1985d). Indeed, the head of the PLO Political 
Department Farouk Kaddumi also tried to visit Buenos Aires, but his visit was 
always discouraged (Mendez 2008, 113). 
 In 1985 and 1987, in line with the previously mentioned ideas, the 
Committee lobbied for the recognition of PLO, as well as for the establishment 
of a Palestinian diplomatic office in the country, by the Argentine government 
through various documents. In 1987, it also happened through a letter directly 
written to President Alfonsín and signed by many social organizations and 
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political parties (La Capital 1987)4. However, it appears that despite the good 
relationship that existed with the Arab community as a whole, the Partido 
Radical did not observe the adequate conditions for the required progress. 
Particularly in a moment that, as already mentioned, the PLO was viewed with 
suspicion by an important part of the international community and it was even 
perceived by the United States as a terrorist organization under its Terrorism 
Act (1987). 
 In any case, despite the position taken against the recognition of the 
PLO and the opening of a diplomatic mission in Buenos Aires, the Alfonsín 
administration tried to maintain good relations with the Arab community in 
general and Palestinians in particular by organizing an event in 
commemoration of the Nakba and also allowing the realization of a seminar 
organized by the UN Committee for the Defense of the Inalienable Rights of the 
Palestinian People (Mendez 2008, 113). 
 It should not be overlooked that it is important for every Argentine 
government to maintain a good relationship with both the Arab and the Jewish 
communities, for ultimately both hold a broad historical and social importance 
in the country centered on the migration flows of the late-nineteenth century. 
In fact, these communities contributed to the process of nation-building and tey 
were eventually integrated into the Argentina society in such ways that 
preserving ties with them becomes a priority. 
 To conclude this section, it should be mentioned that the claim for 
recognition and the opening of diplomatic PLO office in Buenos Aires spread 
                                                 
4 Comité Argentino de Solidaridad con el Pueblo Palestino; Servicio de Paz y Justicia de América Latina; 
Movimiento Ecuménico por Derechos del Hombre; Partido Comunista; Partido Justicialista; 
Movimiento al Socialismo; Frente por los Derechos Humanos; Madres de Plaza de Mayo; Partido 
Intransigente;  Bloque de Concejales Justicialistas de la Ciudad de Rosario;Juventud de la Liga 
Argentina por los Derechos del Hombre;Juventud Radical Bloque de Concejales Peronistas para la 
Victoria; Juventud Peronista Renovadora; la Agrupación Chile Democrático; Partido Socialista 
Auténtico; Juventud Demócrata Cristiana; Agrupación 17 de Octubre; Unión de Estudiantes 
Secundarios; Partido del Trabajo y del Pueblo;  Peronismo Revolucionario; Juventud Universitaria 
Peronista; Familiares de Detenidos y Desaparecidos por Razones Políticas y Gremiales; Partido 
Socialista Popular; Bloque Intransigente del Consejo Municipal de Rosario; Partido Obrero; Partido 
Demócrata Cristiano; Juventud Socialista del MAS; and Centro de Estudiantes de Odontología, 
Humanidades y Artes, Derecho y Ciencia Política de la UNR. 
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throughout the 1980s. However, in this case, the pressures of external and even 
domestic actors were not enough for Argentina to act in this direction. 
 The methods used by the PLO, regarded as a terrorist organization by 
some countries, the distance that other states, with which Argentina sought to 
preserve good relations – United States and also European and Latin American 
countries –, kept from this organization, as well as the aforementioned pressures 
imposed by local and international Jewish communities, refrained the 
inauguration of a diplomatic office of the PLO in Argentina. In fact, there were 
advances in this direction during the Menem administration5, under which 
much closer ties with the PLO were established, in a much more favorable 
context than the one faced by Alfonsín, particularly after the Madrid Summit, 
when the reciprocal recognition of the parties and the signing of the Oslo 
Accords were consolidated. 
 In short, a country that sought international reinsertion should act 
moderately, avoiding to materialize actions like, for example, the authorization 
of a diplomatic office of the PLO in Buenos Aires, or receiving PLO 
representatives at a time when the organization was harshly criticized by 
important partners at the global level. It does not mean that the country, 
according to its historical procedure, stopped defending the rights of the 
Palestinian people in multilateral forums, as it can be observed in subsequent 
sections. 
 After the analysis of the nature of the relations with Palestinian and 
Jewish communities in Argentina, as well as with some of the features of 
bilateral relations with related countries/entities, the article is going to assess 
the positioning of Buenos Aires in the conflict that is object of study in 
international forums. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 After being named the PLO representative in Argentina in 1989, Akel installed the first Palestinian 
Office in Buenos Aires in 1990, still with no official recognition of the Argentine government. In any 
case, the contacts, meetings and commitments with Argentine senior officials gave results when, in the 
mid-1990s, the official inauguration of the Palestinian delegation to Argentina was accepted. Argentina 
then established bilateral relations with the Palestinian National Authority. 
Ornela Fabani  
 
 
 
259 
 
The Argentinian position regarding the conflict in the NAM framework 
In regard to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the organization became a 
space in which the Argentina sought to promote the objectives and guiding 
principles of foreign policy as stated by the Alfonsín administration. It was also 
one of the multilateral forums in which Argentina chose to express its stance 
regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
The Radical government was led by an idealist-ethic perception of 
international politics, but also by a pragmatism that impeded it to ignore 
national interests. Also, the reform of the country´s participation in NAM was 
sought to distance itself from the image that was previously associated to the 
country during the military regime (Saavedra 2004, 78). Hence, the government 
worked towards recovering its founding principles, associated with preventing 
superpowers from eporting their own dispute to territories that did not adhere 
to any of them. Of course, it also sought to reaffirm the rights of Argentina over 
the Malvinas. In order to achieve these purposes, Argentina sought to be within 
the group of moderate countries, but with the strenghtening of its actions. 
Consistent with this more active and greater political commitment, the 
possibility of Argentina to submit its candidacy for the presidency of the 
movement was considered during the first stage of the chancellory. However, it 
was judged that the country did not present the required conditions to advance 
its candidacy, since it did not demonstrate an important level of commitment 
and activity for long periods of time. Moreover, regarding the subject of this 
article, it had not associated itself to some of the great political issues of NAM, 
as it was the case of the situation in the Middle East (Saavedra 2004, 80). In 
fact, Argentina maintained ties with Israel and was generally characterized by 
avoiding the resolutions extremely critical of Tel Aviv, which contained 
recommendations for actions against this country. Besides, Argentina had 
distanced itself from national liberation movements, making clear reservations 
about the legitimacy of armed struggle. In this sense, it can be added that the 
start of the presidential race would have implied that Argentina made 
adjustments in its foreign policy, which political costs the leadership was 
unwilling to deal with (Saavedra 2004, 79). 
As part of the movement, Argentina sought to give priority to those 
issues emphasized by other members, but that also did not imply clashing with 
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its own interests (Saavedra 2004, 89). In this context, whereas Argentina opted 
to sustain its traditional stance of equidistance and ruled out changes in both its 
relations with Israel and its position on the conflict that this country had with 
the Palestinians, the article do not share the opinion of authors who claim, 
without delving into the issue, that the Argentine government sided with the 
Arabs claiming that “the thirdworldism of Alfonsín twinned with whom 
affirmed the Israeli domination was perceived as a foreign power” (Melamed 
2000, 24). By contrast, the balance between the parties in dispute became a 
shelter for the Argentine capacity of international insertion at that stage. 
  During his term in office, President Alfonsín only participated in one 
of the NAM summits, the VIII Summit Conference, held in Harare in 1986. The 
draft of the final statement of this summit had been previously prepared at a 
meeting in Zimbabwe and included the explicit endorsement of the movement 
to the acceptance of a Palestinian State at the United Nations. On the other 
hand, it also expressed the opposition of this group of States to Israel's 
participation in the United Nations Regional Commissions, making the NAM 
pro-Arab stance evident. 
Taking this into consideration, within the framework of the VIII 
Summit Alfonsín recognized the right of the Palestinian people to establish an 
independent state within its own territory and to make use of self-
determination. Also, trying to be fair to both sides, he defended the right of 
Israel to exist within secure and internationally recognized borders in front of 
an organization that still did not recognize this state. Moreover, Argentina 
presented reservations to those paragraphs of the final declaration in which 
Zionism was described as a form of racism and expressed its disagreement with 
the paragraph that expresses the movement’s opposition to the admission of 
Israel as part of any economic regional commission of the UN. In fact, Buenos 
Aires not only disagreed with this point but also unveiled its reservation to the 
declaration on the grounds that this conflicted with the principle of universality 
of the organisms contained in the Charter of the United Nations (Saavedra 
2004, 127). 
This position evinces that despite the criticism that Argentina directed 
towards Israel for its actions in the Palestinian territories, the country valued 
this state when recognizing its existence and trying to avoid the sanctions and 
even the segregation that was somehow promoted by some NAM members. 
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Thus, in line with the policy of equidistance, it chose to defend the rights of 
both peoples, while still recognizing the concerns raised by the situation on the 
territory. 
Finally, despite a position that sought to be balanced – yet regarded by 
some Arab countries as lukewarm –, the defense of the inalienable rights of the 
Palestinian people regarding this dispute and some changes that the country 
made in foreign policy, as was the case of the severance of diplomatic relations 
with South Africa, were sufficient for the country to introduce in the final 
declaration of Harare a paragraph in which members of the movement 
emphasized strongly support for the Argentine rights over Malvinas, exhorting 
the parties to resume negotiations within the framework of the United Nations. 
 
 
The Argentinian position on the conflict in the United Nations framework 
Regarding the Argentine position on the conflict at the United Nations, 
Chancellor Caputo affirmed in his speech to the 40th General Assembly (1985) 
that the Palestinian issue was of great concern to his government, and then 
added: "the essential aim [...] is that the Palestinian people exercise their 
inalienable right to self-determination and independence, to establish their own 
national state and have their legitimate representation in negotiations that 
have to be established for this purpose" (Caputo 1985). Also, the Argentine 
representative asked for the respect to the right to existence, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of all countries in the region, among them Israel, as well as 
their right to enjoy internationally recognized safe borders. 
A year later, when appearing before the 41st General Assembly, the 
Argentine Foreign Minister again stressed: 
 
Argentina supports the need for the Palestinian people to finally see their 
right to become an independent state in its own territory recognized, 
governing with the authorities they freely elected and making use of their 
full self-determination. Similarly, we reaffirm the right of all states in the 
region, including Israel, to live within secure and internationally recognized 
borders. For the same reasons, we condemn all actions that threaten the 
existence of these rights, like with the occupation of territories by force, 
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and acts of terrorism and violence that blight lives, destroy families and 
maim children and the youth. (Caputo 1986a, Our Translation) 
 
From these speeches, it is possible to understand the continuity of the 
traditional Argentine policy of equidistance that the country once again 
presented for a balanced approach recognizing the rights of each of the parties 
on the disputed territory and condemning any violation thereto. Thus, a follow-
up was given to the policy adopted by previous efforts at a time in which the 
balance was judged as the most reasonable choice to embrace. Especially 
considering that this conflict was alien to Argentina, which then had to face 
serious internal problems linked to the economic crisis and to demands for 
justice that enraged Argentine people, as well as significant external challenges, 
like its quest for international reinsertion. 
That said, as a non-permanent member of the Security Council of the 
United Nations during the biennium 1987-1988, Argentina had to position itself 
facing the crisis that sparked the first Intifada6. Then, at the beginning of the 
97th session of the UN Security Council, in early December 1987, Argentina 
supported the proposal presented by the delegate from UAE to invite the 
Palestinian representative to participate of discussions on the situation of 
territories occupied by Israel. In this regard, it is important to emphasize that 
this attitude proved that the country did not ignore the role of the organization 
as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, although it was 
reluctant to strengthen ties bilaterally with the organization, in an 
international context that was not judged favorable at the time. 
However, given the clashes that happened at that time, a draft 
resolution was submitted by non-permanent members of the Security Council, 
including Argentina. The document, adopted unanimously as resolution No. 
607, affirmed: “the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War [...] is applicable to Palestinian and other Arab 
territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem”. Moreover, “Calls 
                                                 
6 It is worth to remember that this event had its origins in December 1987 as a spontaneous uprising of 
the Palestinean people in the occupied territories, which was manifested through economic boycott, 
resistence to the payment of taxes and also stoning of Israeli forces that were located within the 
territories. 
Ornela Fabani  
 
 
 
263 
 
upon Israel to refrain from deporting Palestinian civilians from the occupied 
territories.” 
Days later, Security Council Resolution No. 608, the result of another 
draft resolution also filed by non-permanent members, called upon Israel to 
rescind the order to deport Palestinian civilians and to ensure that those already 
deported could return immediately and safely to the occupied Palestinian 
territories. 
It is worth to add thatthis group of Third World states that worked as 
non-permanent members presented various draft resolutions in which Israeli 
actions in the occupied territories were repudiated throughout 1988. However, 
except for the aforementioned resolutions, the other drafts were not approved 
because of the negative votes of the United States. Still, a feature of such 
instruments of which Argentina was co-author is that while they denounced 
Israeli actions, the drafts did not propose any sanctions that, on the other hand, 
were not supported by the South American country. As already mentioned, 
Buenos Aires tried to preserve its historical ties with both Israel and with the 
main supporters of the Palestinian cause among Arab countries during that 
period. 
Finally, another highlight with regard to the Argentine participation in 
United Nations is that the Argentine foreign minister was elected to the 
presidency of the General Assembly during the 43rd session in 1988. It was a 
particularly important stage of the Middle Eastern dispute, which coincided 
with the proclamation of independence of the Palestinian State, in Algiers. 
Besides, the United States decided to deny a visa to Yasser Arafat so that the 
PLO leader could not attend the session of the General Assembly to be held in 
mid-December 1988. 
In this context, the Argentine foreign minister sided with the Secretary-
General of UN to promote this meeting at the UN headquarters in Geneva, a 
movement that allowed Arafat to address the Assembly. During this encounter, 
two important resolutions were approved: on one hand, Resolution No. 43/176, 
which urged the organization of a peace conference in the Middle East under the 
auspices of UN. The resolution – which was adopted with one hundred thirty-
eight votes in favor, two votes against and two abstentions – had the 
endorsement of Argentina, in line with one of the guiding principles of the 
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Alfonsín administration and also with the traditional position of the South 
American country, which has always favored a peaceful settlement of the 
conflict. On the other hand, Resolution 431/177, which aknowledged of the 
proclamation of a Palestinian state, received the positive vote of Argentina, one 
of the ten Latin American countries that supported the resolution7. However, it 
must be highlighted that this did not involve the formal recognition of it. The 
recognition was conceded only by two Latin American countries, while Buenos 
Aires was inclined to wait for a more favorable international context. 
Nonetheless, the country judged the Algiers Declaration as an important 
contribution to the search for a solution to the dispute (Saavedra 2004, 129). 
 
 
Conclusion 
As pointed out in the beginning of the article, the situation in the Middle East 
in general, and particularly in the Palestinian-Israeli Question, did not occupy 
an important place in the Argentine foreign policy’s agenda during the period 
between December 1983 and July 1989. On the contrary, the Alfonsín 
administration gave priority to the approach of other themes and to links with 
other geographical areas. 
 In the internal plan, however, a very close relation with the Jewish 
local community, which was a strong supporter of the Radical government, was 
maintained. On the other hand, the maintenance of the link to the Arab 
community was attempted. In this sense, while the relations with the first 
group were cordial in general, they were far more turbulent with the small local 
Palestinian community. As of the relations with Israel, they had not been at the 
level that the Middle Eastern country had desired due to the critical position 
adopted by Argentina after Israeli actions in Lebanon and Palestine, though 
political contact was productive. Regarding the relations with PLO, suspicions 
made clear by important partners of Buenos Aires towards the political group, 
as well as the fact that some of them considered these Palestinians a terrorist 
                                                 
7 The other nine countries of the region were Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama and Peru. 
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organization, among other reasons, made Argentina evaluate that there were no 
proper conditions to establish closer relations with the organization. 
 As of the Argentine positions regarding this question in the framework 
of international organizations, Buenos Aires presented some initiatives 
favorable to the protection of the people involved in the conflict during its 
tenure as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Within the 
General Assembly, however, it supported a peace conference, added to other 
resolutions favorable to strengthen the dialogue between the parties involved. 
 Likewise, it is important to highlight that both in the United Nations 
and the Non-Aligned Movement, accordingly to the traditional Argentinian 
position on the case, the country adopted a balanced position, defending the 
right of the Palestinian people to organize an independent state, with its own 
territory, exercizing its inalienable right to self-determination, as well as the 
Israeli right to live in peace with safe and internationally recognized 
boundaries. Furthermore, it is important to stress that the Radical government 
condemned the human rights violations of both Tel Aviv and radical Islamic 
groups, in line with its position favorable to topics related to human rights. 
 Finally, the equidistance policy resulted coherent for a country that 
was unrelated to the dispute and for a government that had to face many 
serious internal problems, as well as important external challenges, and that 
evaluated that the most profitable action would be to show no innovations, and 
to bet on the balance between the parties. 
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ABSTRACT 
The Middle East has been the stage of some of the major conflicts that have 
taken place in recent times. Among them, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has 
kept the region on edge for decades. The aim of this paper is to analyze 
Argentina’s foreign policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict during the 
administration of Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989). 
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